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 Electricity was an obvious candidate in the renewed drive to complete a European 
single market in the Delors years.  Despite the energy sector being the first candidate for 
European integration in 1951, electricity consumption remained, in the mid 1980s, tied to a 
regional monopoly supplier, resulting, in the opinion of the Commission, in inflated prices 
and a lack of innovation.  As a key factor in production costs in manufacturing industry, and a 
contributory factor to every household bill, the electricity supply industry, wholly untouched 
by market logic, presented a ripe apple for a (then) confident European Commission keen to 
progress the frontiers of project Europe, and demonstrate tangible results in European 
integration by the promise of lower prices arising from the introduction of competition. 
 
 Today, less than 13 years since the Commission started the ball of electricity 
liberalisation rolling, almost two thirds of the European electricity supply industry is subject 
to competition, resulting in real terms price reductions for consumers, with the prospect of 
complete market opening within the next five years.  All of this has come about despite the 
opposition, at the outset at least, of most member states, and some of the largest producer 
organisations in Europe.  How can this stark outcome be explained?  What role did producer 
and public interests play in this outcome, and which factors explain this pattern?  What 
lessons can be learnt about the role of private interests in European integration from this case?   
 
The first part of the story of electricity liberalisation, accounting for events up to a 
1996 Directive leading to partial market opening, has been extensively undertaken elsewhere 
(Conant, 1999; Eberlein, 2000; Eising, 1999; Eising and Jabko, 1999; Schmidt, 1997; 1998), 
and is summarised in the section that follows.  Some of the analysis is however contestable, 
and here some rival explanations are offered.  Some analysis is also provided of events up to a 
second Directive, due to appear in draft form in January 2001, for acceleration of the process 
of liberalisation providing a quicker route to full market opening than the 1996 Directive had 
envisaged.  The second question – the role of producer and public interests in EU electricity 
liberalisation - has never been comprehensively undertaken, despite the presence of some 
partial accounts included within analysis of a number of sectors (Bartle, 1999; Sietses, 2000).  
The third endeavour, the generalisability requirement of any case study, leads to analysis of 
the circumstances under which private interests are not in the forefront of European 
integration in particular policy sectors.  This latter task remains under theorised (Grande, 
1996), notwithstanding well recognised foci in the established ‘interest group’ literature upon 
private interest division and disorganisation.  Despite the recent explosion of institutional 
analysis in political science, relatively little of this has been directed at understanding the 
conditions under which political institutions remain relatively insulated from private and 
public interest pressures.    
 
The Story of Electricity Liberalisation 
 
 Ironically, one of the triggers to EU electricity liberalisation was initiated by the 
organisation which has since been the largest obstacle to it – Electricité de France (EdF), 
responsible for 95% of French electricity generation and distribution, and virtually all the 
transmission grid (Klom, 1997). EdF’s production capacity of electricity is around 250% that 
of its nearest counterpart in another member state (Electrabel, 1999), and in 1994 was the 
largest exporter of electricity in Europe (Klom, 1997).  It initially (1986-8) saw the single 
European market as an opportunity to use its excess capacity to export to other markets in 
Europe, and filed a state-aid complaint with the Commission against the German government 
subsidisation of its coal industry (Schmidt, 1998).  It had also been frustrated by Spain’s 
refusal to allow it to use the Spanish grid to transport excess capacity in response to the 
request of a Portuguese consumer, which had been a contributory factor to a Council 
resolution of 1986 calling the Commission to action (Eising and Jabko, 1999).  Later, EdF 
was to regret helping to open the Pandora’s box of electricity liberalisation, and by 1989 it 
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had come to appreciate the threat to its position that requirements to liberalise its home 
market might bring.  
 
 It would, however, be mistaken to see EdF as the principal trigger to EU electricity 
liberalisation.  The industry was always a likely candidate for liberalisation, and the main 
thrust was provided by the broader climate of single market completion generated by the 
Delors years, and a Commission on the march. The window of opportunity was widened by 
the UK experiment in privatisation, which was about to demonstrate (1989) the feasibility of 
devising a system of competition whilst still using a single transmission infrastructure.  That 
is, the activities involved in delivering electricity to the factory or domestic doorstep, could be 
segregated into the activities of generation; transmission to major centres for subsequent 
distribution; and traded supply to individual points of consumption.  The combination of 
ideas, circumstances, bandwagon, and policy entrepreneur selling a solution, foretold by 
Kingdon’s insightful analysis of the creation of policy agendas, were there.  A potential 
support constituency interested in cheaper electricity prices could be mobilised.  With a 
choice of legislative instruments to achieve its goal, the prospects seemed good.  Based on 
resolutions dating from the Energy Council in 1986 and 1987 (EURELECTRIC and Lyons, 
2000), the Commission issued its consultative Green Paper in 1988 with substantive plans to 
liberalise the sector (Commission, 1998), followed by separate, first step Directives in 1990 
on transit (90/547/EEC) and an uncontroversial set of measures on price transparency 
(91/296/EEC).   
 
 The Commission initially favoured use of an Article 90 procedure to achieve 
liberalisation, granting it the independent competence to address directives to Member States 
in order to ensure application of the Treaty rules for European competition law to state 
enterprises.  This controversial procedure had already been used in another public sector 
monopoly area, telecommunications, with some success in the form of a 1988 Directive.  
When Article 90 was proposed as the preferred instrument in conjunction with infringement 
procedures under competition law, a bullish path to liberalisation seemed possible, and until 
the Autumn of 1991, was the chosen path of the Commission.  In July 1991, the Commission 
circulated a draft Article 90 Directive, and initiated infringement procedures against import 
and export monopolies in electricity in nine member states (Conant, 1999).  Yet by October 
1991, the Commission had decided to abandon its use of an Article 90 Directive in favour of a 
more consensual approach, an Article 100a directive (published in 1992) requiring a qualified 
majority and enabling the input of the Parliament with its newly strengthened powers under 
co-decision.  In fact, so contentious was the concept of liberalisation in electricity proving 
that it required de facto unanimity in the Council, in that a Franco-German summit on the 
matter, with longer term considerations for their relationship in mind, had ended with 
agreement not to leave each-other isolated on the matter.   The path was set for a highly 
compromised directive with somewhat watered down proposals for liberalisation. 
 
 The opposition to the liberalisation proposals was mainly Member State led. At the 
outset, only the UK (in the process of delivering its own liberalisation), Ireland (with 
liberalisation under consideration, although later to switch sides) and Portugal (with 
inadequate production capacity) supported it among the then member states.  A number were 
implacably opposed, including France, and, at the outset, Germany.  With these most basic of 
calculations, the Commission would have been unwise to press ahead with an Article 90 
Directive.  This opposition was also expressed in debates and public hearings in the European 
Parliament, and in the decision of national electricity utilities to establish a European wide 
trade association, EURELECTRIC, to oppose the initiatives – although the ability of the latter 
to do so effectively would always be restrained by differing views.  
 
Certainly, the Commission would have needed more time and nerve to press ahead 
with the use of Article 1990 in 1991.  Whilst the government of the Netherlands was soon to 
join the coalition in favour, it was not until the German Presidency of 1995 that the German 
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position has switched to being fully supportive of electricity liberalisation, following 
incremental adjustment from 1993, and, critically, following the conversion of most of the 
German utilities to the idea by 1994.  Undoubtedly, Germany’s conversion proved a major 
landmark in finally delivering liberalisation, and has been explained by Eising and Jakbo as a 
gradual switch based on ‘policy learning’ by the German government, both from the UK 
experience and from acclimatisation to the liberalisation proposals within the Council of 
Ministers.  Whilst carrying some degree of plausibility, the two years volte-face is too short a 
time period for policy learning to produce such a dramatic effect.  In addition, it somewhat 
underplays the role of German electricity prices, at that time the highest in Europe, and 50% 
higher than those in the US (Financial Times, 1996), and the interests of its domestic 
manufacturing industry in lower input costs.  As is evident later, most of the firms active in 
pursuing electricity liberalisation at the EU level in the ‘ENERG8’ coalition were German.  
Of all countries, German industry has also been among the loudest voices seeking, recently, 
an accelerated programme of liberalisation.    
 
 Just as crucial to the final achievement of a Directive was the final decision of the 
French to compromise.  The 1992 draft directive was a direct threat to the French public 
service tradition, causing a strike amongst EdF workers in 1992 organised by the Communist 
CGT (Confédération Général du Travail) Union.  Three years later, a wave of more strikes 
among public sector workers in general about issues of public sector job security crippled the 
French economy.  Whilst the use of an Article 100a procedure only required a qualified 
majority, there was never a question of a vote being used because of the basic principle of 
vital national interest was at stake (EURELECTRIC and Lyons, 2000).  In this context, the 
French willingness to compromise seems remarkable.  The EU Electricity Liberalisation 
Directive (96/92/EC) finally approved at the end of 1996 took intensive efforts from four 
Presidencies involving significant compromises and trading of drafts, a Franco-German 
intergovernmental summit, and some fast footwork from the Commission to achieve. Among 
the latter, one strategy involved the maintenance of pressure by the use of infringement 
proceedings, leading to French fears of an outcome from European Court of Justice decisions 
(expected in 1998) which might be worse than a liberalisation Directive.  In short, French 
interests faced the classic dilemma of whether they would be better off on the inside trying to 
limit the damage, or outright opposition.  They chose the former strategy.  Whilst French 
anxieties over ECJ decisions had been partly relieved by some surprisingly favourable 1994 
decisions (the Corbeau and Almelo cases; see Conant, 1999), some senior French civil 
servants were already finding the progressive loss of support (particularly Germany) in the 
Council uncomfortable, and had started to seek a solution.  Almost as an exercise in damage 
limitation, France proposed an alternative (‘Single Buyer’ model, below) to the model 
proposed in the Commission’s draft Directive, under the rhetoric of ‘liberalisation’, yet in 
reality aimed at watering it down as much as possible.  The Commission’s skill in adapting 
and extending this to include it within the embrace of a compromise re-drafted Directive 
helped achieve the outcome they wanted, not least because the Commission also were 
uncertain of where future ECJ decisions would leave the project.   
 
The Commission also showed itself adept at responding to the concerns of the 
Parliament and environmental NGOs by changing the detail of those proposals which could 
be conceded without too much difficulty, and to Trade Unions by rhetoric to take initiatives to 
mitigate the effects on employment of liberalisation.  These factors apart, a number of other 
events proved favourable to the Commission’s cause, including the accession of Sweden and 
Finland, both enthusiastic to the electricity liberalisation dossier, and the increasing warmth 
of Spain and Italy to the idea.   
 
 The initial 1992 draft Directive had proposed a system of ‘regulated third party 
access’ (rTPA) as a key mechanism to achieve competition in electricity supply.  This was 
part of a broader set of principles involving the separation of the process of electricity supply 
into generation, transmission, distribution and supply to the consumer using principles first 
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adopted in the UK.  Third Party Access (TPA) involves the latter of these activities, and is so    
called because it involves enabling a party other than the electricity generator and transmitter 
to ‘enter’ the grid to purchase electricity from these other parties, and to sell it on to 
consumers.  It is the quickest route to liberalisation, because it does not require new market 
entrants to make long term investments in capital intensive equipment, such as generating 
stations or transmission wires/pylons.  Indeed, until now electricity liberalisation has left 
alone the monopoly positions of the national grid transmission networks, while in theory 
allowing complete competition in generation without expecting this to yield significant new 
market entrants as a result of the capital intensive nature involved in market entry.   
 
The solution to France’s dilemma (outright opposition, or damage limitation on the 
inside) was to propose a rival system, the ‘Single Buyer’ model, on which a very limited 
model of liberalisation could be based.  In this, the generator/producer (such as EdF) could 
also act as the ‘buyer’ of all the electricity purchased by its consumers from other sources, 
using published tariffs, with the purchaser pocketing any profit between the price it paid to 
source the electricity, and the sell on price to the single buyer.  The initial version of this was 
sent for scrutiny by the Commission to an independent team of analysts in Germany, who 
concluded that, whilst the initial proposal was inconsistent with internal market rules, it could 
be adapted to be consistent and for use in the Directive.  Once the model had been proposed 
as a route to liberalisation, France could hardly revert to outright opposition, and the adapted 
version was used as a compromise.  Hence, the final 1996 Directive enabled member states to 
choose between regulatory schemes – a negotiated Third Party Access (nTPA) system 
favoured by Germany and the European Parliament, a regulated Third Party Access favoured 
by other countries supportive of liberalisation, and a Single Buyer model then favoured by 
France and allied countries with liberalisation concerns (Greece; Belgium).   The menu of 
choice was extended by enabling Member States to choose between a system of legal, 
management, or accountancy separation of generation, transmission, distribution and supply 
systems.  A further important feature was that the Directive was based upon an incremental 
system of market opening, starting with a requirement to subject 25% of electricity demand to 
competition from the time the Directive came into force in February 1999 (Belgium and 
Ireland were given one year extensions, Greece two), to 33% by 2003.  Consistent with the 
choice menu nature of the Directive, those member states who wished to open their markets 
further were free to do so at any time.   
 
In practice, by the time the Directive came into force, most of northern Europe had 
already fully opened up their electricity markets to competition, while some others (most 
notably Spain) have exceeded the requirements laid out by the 1996 Directive.  The Single 
Buyer model, designed to forestall liberalisation, was eroding into disuse everywhere 
including its country of origin, France (Commission, 2000).  Most countries have made the 
choice, from the menu available in the 1996 Directive, of the scheme most consistent with 
liberalisation, i.e. regulated Third Party Access together with a licensing procedure for 
generation, and most countries had liberalised at a faster pace than the Directive timescale.  
Market forces have matured, with most of the UK regional electricity companies by now 
bought up by American firms.  American firms such as ENRON have become aggressive 
market entrants to electricity trading, and very active at the European level in pursuing further 
liberalisation.  Spanish utilities have enthusiastically sought opportunities to raid capacities in 
the French market, while the once reluctant Belgians did not use the full extension they were 
given to put the directive into effect.  Some of the original reluctants in the south of Europe 
have identified electricity liberalisation as a means of pursuing lower inflation targets, and in 
gaining access to the grid for renewable sources.  There are even stories circulating that the 
top executives of EdF, whilst avoiding public differences from their government, are now 
looking forward to some of the opportunities liberalisation brings.   
 
The principle of liberalisation had clearly been conceded, the liberalising tide had 
turned, and European industry had started to reap the benefits of lower electricity prices.  As 
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the Commission had correctly predicted at the conclusion of the 1996 Directive, ‘this deal 
partially opens the door.  We hope the partially opened door will be kicked open by market 
forces’ (Financial Times, 1996, p.23). Electricity prices did fall significantly in response to 
liberalisation, and more so in those countries opting for complete market opening 
(Commission, 2000).  At a time when electricity consumption is forecast to increase by 40% 
over the next 20 years (Matthes and Timpe, 2000), there seemed no turning back, and the 
logical thing to do was to extend the benefits to all Europe’s consumers, domestic and 
industrial. Whilst pressures for more liberalisation emerged from national governments, 
customers, and electricity companies, it is the European Commission that has taken the 
driving seat, with President Prodi proposing to the March 2000 Lisbon summit that a new 
programme should be put in place which would produce 100% liberalisation by 2004.  Whilst 
this was not adopted, it was decided that an acceleration of liberalisation should be launched 
so as to create a fully operational internal energy market, and that the Commission should 
bring forward proposals to accelerate liberalisation, with a draft Directive expected from 
January 2001.  At the public hearings on the detail of the new Directive, hosted in September 
2000 by DG TREN (Transport and Energy) of the European Commission, EdF opposition to 
the pace and quantity of liberalisation was somewhat isolated.  Indeed, such has been the pace 
and momentum of liberalisation that the French position has shifted to supporting the rhetoric 
of liberalisation but opposing the detail.  Prediction is a dangerous activity, but writing at the 
turn of 2000/1, it looks very much like the Commission drive to achieve electricity 
liberalisation is about to be realised. 
 
 
Electricity Liberalisation – The Role of Producer and Public Interests 
 
 The story told above indicates the role of producer interests in informing the positions 
of national governments in preference formation, and the subsequent transfer of these to 
intergovernmental negotiations.  German industrial consumers of electricity, subject to the 
highest prices in Europe, played a significant role in changing the position of their 
government towards electricity liberalisation to a favourable one.  The actions of the French 
government, on the other hand, were largely explicable by reference to their position as 
owner-shareholder of Electricité de France.   But what of the role of producer, and other types 
of interests, organised at the European level?  Given the somewhat patchy coverage of this 
question in public literature, additional methods used in answering this question range from 
‘grey’ literature available from a range of interest organisations, to the use of focused, semi-
structured interviews.  Where an assessment has been made of the impact of any one type of 
interest or organisation, each assessment has involved conducting interviews with multiple 
sources.  These span the producer industry, consumer industrial interests, public interest 
groups, and policy officials, as well as sources from the literature in conjunction with 
established tools of analysis.  In total, some 18 interviews were conducted in this way, 
supported by wide distribution of draft text. 
 
European level organised interests have not been decisive to any of the outcomes 
described above. Taken together, differences among key producer utilities mean they have 
played a reactive role, following rather than driving agreements reached in the political 
institutions.  EURELECTRIC had been formed to oppose the proposals for liberalisation, and 
did so consistently until 1995, including a somewhat aggressively hostile approach in the 
early 1990s.  This approach yielded changes to details, but not to the core principle of 
liberalisation.  The electricity supply industry, through EURELECTRIC and its regular 
dialogue with the Commission, had managed to tone down some of the more radical 
ambitions of the Commission in 1991, and had a major input into an influential European 
Parliament Opinion of November 1993, which, prompted the Commission to publish revised 
proposals including, inter alia, introduced the concept of negotiated Third Party Access 
(EURELECTRIC and Lyons, 2000).  A key turning point in the approach of EURELECTRIC 
towards liberalisation was the accession of Scandinavian members into full membership in 
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1995, which changed the balance of internal opinion, causing the organisation to publicly 
admit that different views existed within its membership on the internal electricity market 
debate (ibid.).  EURELECTRIC’s most positive role was finally to support the final draft of 
the Commission’s 1996 Directive, and to call upon the Parliament (whose Energy Committee 
had been seeking to use its new co-decision powers to issue amendments) and Council to do 
so without amendment. Indeed, this was the outcome.  EURELECTRIC’s role in the years 
following the Directive shifted to one of behind the scenes technical co-operation with the 
Commission (including a move from Paris to Brussels), whilst the electricity supply industry 
in national contexts focused attention to the requirements for transposing the Directive.  It is 
presently seeking to adopt a position on accelerated liberalisation, although the realities of 
member differences, centred around EdF, mean that it is difficult for it to do so in detail, other 
than a position that it ‘firmly believes that it is realistic to aim for a faster opening of the 
market’ (EURELECTRIC and Lyons, 2000, p. 98).   
 
European level trade unions, whilst active throughout the debate in opposing 
liberalisation on the grounds of its anticipated impact on employment, had little to fight with 
and seemingly no impact upon the outcome.  Public interest groups, including consumers 
(with interests in lower electricity prices) and environmental NGOs, have supported the 
historic process to differing degrees, and both sets of interests broadly support the 
acceleration of liberalisation, with some significant derogation of detail.  Public consumer 
groups wanted the benefits to be delivered to domestic consumers much quicker than the 
1996 Directive envisaged, though concerns about the universality, quality and safety could at 
that stage be reassured (BEUC, 1994; 1995a, b, c; 1996).  For some environmental public 
interest groups, liberalisation offered the prospect of more environmentally friendly forms of 
generation, such as natural gas instead of coal and nuclear, as a result of pressures for cheaper 
and more energy efficient forms of generation.  In this, they found allies in a growing, though 
still small, segment of the producer sector, where recent technologies enable the production of 
combined heat and power simultaneously (co-generation), often using gas, resulting in a new 
sector association (Cogen Europe) representing equipment manufacturers and industrial users.  
The Commission has been receptive to these inputs, though not to the extent that 
environmental NGOs, and Cogen Europe would have wished.  Other environmental groups, 
such as Greenpeace, have been more critical, drawing attention to the way in which electricity 
liberalisation produces certain trends detrimental to the environment, such as increased 
consumption arising from downward pressure on costs (Greenpeace, 2000).  Environmental 
public interest groups may have influenced some of the detail accompanying the debate 
(Table 1, below), sometimes through separate policy initiatives (such as transparency pricing 
to prevent hidden subsidies, or the present Renewables Directive), though have not been 
central in delivering the outcome of liberalisation. A recent report for the WorldWide Fund 
for Nature concluded that ‘it can be expected that environmental considerations will play only 
a minor role in the (acceleration) process’ (Matthes and Timpe, 2000, p.8).  Whilst EU 
environmental lobbies benefit from co-ordination of campaigning (including the ‘good 
cop/bad cop’ team approach which embraces networks involving Greenpeace and WWF), 
liberalisation in principle and practice can produce tensions within environmental movements.  
Firstly, in principle activists are not always persuaded by market principles. Secondly, in 
practice, market induced downward pressures on costs can have positive environmental 
effects through the introduction of co-generation, and negative effects through increased 
consumption.  Tensions can also arise in seeking to incorporate arguments that state aid be 
denied from one sector of industry (such as nuclear and fossil fuel production), and yet be 
granted to another (renewables), particularly in areas such as energy where there is no Treaty 
base other than through internal market measures.   
 
A somewhat greater role has been played by industrial large-scale electricity 
consumers, although this should not be exaggerated.  Their role has been a supporting one to 
the Commission, and even had they not been active at the European level, it is hard to 
imagine a different outcome to the one described above.  The two most significant 
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organisations in this limited contribution appear to have been the European section of the 
International Federation of Industrial Energy Consumers (IFIEC), an association of 
associations with 13 members representing 75-80% of industrial energy consumption in 
Europe, and ENERG8, an issue network of large electricity consumption firms.  IFIEC is 
highly regarded by the Commission, and is noted for delivering thoughtful responses to 
Commission consultation papers.  A number of interview informants who have been on the 
inside of the process from industry have indicated that, of all producer interests, IFIEC played 
the greatest role.  Despite these, there are a number of reasons to proceed with caution.  
Firstly, its work with the Commission has stretched its somewhat limited resources, and tends 
to have been reactive rather than proactive in nature.  Secondly, some commentators have 
drawn attention to divisions within IFIEC, themselves not untypical for a federation of 
federation structure (Bartle, 1999; Sietses, 2000).  Some of these are centred around French 
members (ibid.), who already benefited from some of the lowest electricity prices in Europe 
and saw no reason for change.  A third factor is what Schmidt refers to as the ability of the 
industry to ‘buy off’ its opposition.  Everytime a consumer complained about its inability to 
access cheaper sources of electricity, industry could make arrangements to match the better 
bargain the consumer had found, and consequently only a trickle of cases reached the ECJ 
from producer interests (Schmidt, 1998). 
 
Sietses links the formation of ENERG8 directly to the classic collective action 
problems of associations, and particularly to those of IFIEC, and to CEFIC, the European 
Chemical Industry Council (Sietses, 1988).  In his analysis, the latter organisation reportedly 
had problems until around 1995 in arriving at common positions because of the interests of oil 
and gas companies, themselves affected by attempts at gas liberalisation, although how the 
blockage in CEFIC became lifted c.1995 is unclear.  The downstream trade association of the 
oil industry, EUROPIA (European Petrochemicals Industry Association), has never had any 
position on electricity liberalisation, despite its position on the producer section of the EU 
Energy Consultative Committee (ECC).  Sietses also refers to the collective action difficulties 
experienced by UNICE (Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe), 
although this may be more a reference to its generally wide constituency and consequent 
tendency towards lowest common denominator positions than to the specific case of 
electricity liberalisation.  Its former General Secretary, Zygmunt Tyszkiewicz, reports no 
difficulty at all throughout the process of electricity liberalisation in UNICE taking a 
supportive role, because the public sector monopoly utilities were not in membership of 
UNICE member organisations prior to the 1996 Directive.  Nonetheless, Sietses is dismissive 
of the role of associations in the debate, and instead builds up a model of company interest 
representation at the EU level in electricity liberalisation, starting with the European Round 
Table of Industrialists (ERT) c. 1991.   
 
Electricity liberalisation represented the kind of high politics attractive to the ERT.  It 
commented on the process in a number of reports between 1990-3, including some of its most 
famous commentaries on the climate for European business (e.g. Rebuilding Confidence, 
1992; Beating the Crisis, 1993) (ERT, 1992; 1993), pressing the case for liberalisation on the 
basis of price comparisons with the USA.  Once the issue had emerged fully onto the 
European agenda and was clearly heading for action, the ERT, true to its role as a ‘big issue’ 
agenda setter’, withdrew from the issue. Some of its most affected members, as intensive 
energy users, took the issue on in the form of the ENERG8 coalition, so called because of the 
number of large firms involved at one time, including Bayer, BASF, ICI, Dow Europe, 
Thyssen, Pilkington,  Akzo Nobel, and Mercedes Benz.  Whilst the network followed the 
ERT format of invited direct membership and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) representation 
in an attempt to avoid classic collective action problems, it too became subject to lowest 
common denominator issues itself when membership grew in number and sectoral diversity.  
It first met in 1992, largely prompted by the European Commission in need of constituencies 
of support, who told large industrial consumers that ‘no one whistles your tune in the 
corridors of the Commission’ (Sietses, 2000, p. 77).  This helps explain its ability to get high 
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level access to the Commission, including Presidential level.  ENERG8 supported the process 
until the Directive came into force, and has since withered to inactivity.  Indeed, one reason 
for exercising caution as to the role of ENERG8 is that a number of key figures in the debate 
have little recollection as to its role, whilst more recent industry leaders have not even heard 
of it.  It was a supporter of the process rather than a leader. 
 
The following is an assessment of the role of all industrial interests and interest 
organisations with a role in the liberalisation process: 
 
Table 1: Private and Public (non-state) Interests in Electricity Liberalisation 
 
1. EU level Producer Associations/Collective Fora 
 
Organisation Description Historic Relationship to 
Liberalisation (+, -, active?) 
EURELECTRIC – Union 
of the Electricity Industry 
Members (national 
associations, or where 
absent, utilities) 
involved with the 
generation, 
transmission, 
distribution, and supply 
of electricity.   
 
Originally established to oppose 
liberalisation, and did so through its 
continental members until mid 
1990s.  In regular dialogue with 
Commission throughout 
liberalisation process.  Now reflects 
the 1996 directive position, and the 
activities and different views of 
internal active members (see 
below).  Well connected & involved 
with Commission, highly involved 
at a technical level, and acts to the 
limits of its member architecture.  
Presently working on a position on 
the extent and speed of liberalisation 
(EURELECTRIC and Lyons, 2000), 
though articulates general support 
for accelerated liberalisation. ECC 
industry member. 
‘Northern Group’  Northern members of 
EURELECTRIC (minus 
Ireland), informal 
grouping, active from c. 
1995.  Core members 
are, D, Fin, NL, S, UK.  
Dk a background 
member; I and E late 
converts.   
First wave of liberalisers, still active 
in taking forward liberalisation 
agenda. Now the dominant coalition 
within EURELECTRIC, the latter’s 
positions are now pro liberalisation 
in rhetoric, though the detail and 
ability to be proactive of 
EURELECTRIC reflects the input 
of ‘Reluctants’ below.   
 
‘Reluctants’  Edf plus Belgian, Irish 
(changed from pro 
during very early 
stages), Greek, 
Luxembourg members 
of EURELECTRIC,  
France and Belgium are 
particularly reliant upon 
nuclear electricity 
generation. 
Opposed.  Original response to 
liberalisation was the single buyer 
model.  Interests drawn from 
countries often last to implement 
directive. As the liberalisation 
agenda has progressed, so the 
positions of this group have also 
progressed in public rhetoric - e.g. 
progression from single buyer 
model to regulated TPA, and claims 
to support accelerated liberalisation 
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- though at a slower rate for % and 
timescale than ‘Northern’ group.  
EdF remains well connected in EU 
high politics arenas, and with some 
shareholdings in privatised 
companies, the potential (as yet, 
unrealised) to influence the 
positions of some actors in the ‘pro’ 
camp.   
(European Association for 
Renewables) 
Now a grouping inside 
Eurelectric, once 
outside 
Active to secure own position 
issues, e.g. with DG Envt interests 
on bio fuels, large combustion plant 
directive etc, though not a major 
liberalisation player 
   
EFET – Electricity and 
Gas Traders 
Now a grouping 
established outside 
Eurelectric after a 
period (of dissatisfaction 
at their representation) 
within, though with 
membership for supply 
interest purposes.  
Encouraged by DG 
(then) XVII.  The US 
firm ENRON is a 
significant member, and 
voice for liberalisation. 
Created at time of early Florence 
regulatory conferences, c. 1998; 
raison d’être possible as a result of 
liberalisation. 
European Heat and 
Power  
Association  
 
Overlapping 
membership with 
EURELECTRIC, plus 
municipal members.  
Formed 1994.   
Closely aligned with 
EURELECTRIC, though never anti 
liberalisation.  Enjoys good 
Commission links. ECC industry 
member. 
   
CEDEC – European 
Federation of Local Public 
Energy Distribution 
Companies 
Municipal Members 
from D, F, I, B, A, 
claiming a 20% market 
share of supply.  Estab. 
1992. 
Traditional, public sector view of 
liberalisation where focus is more 
on threats.  Opposed 1992.  Still 
active, broadly opposed, though  
never central. In 1999, issued a joint 
statement of opposition with the 
trade union organisation EPSU (see 
below).  Recent position paper 
(CEDEC, 2000) focuses on 
damaging employment effects of 
liberalisation, seeking more gradual 
introduction (i.e. against accelerated 
liberalisation), but to enable local 
distributors to compete with 
dominant producers.   
 ECC industry member.   
   
Energie Cités Wide network, formed 
c. 1997, based around 
local and regional 
ECC industry member.  Not 
significant in recent liberalisation. 
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authorities in western, 
central and eastern 
Europe, and 
representative 
organisations.  87 full 
(western European) 
members.  Producer 
(municipality as 
producer and 
distributor) and 
consumer interests. 
   
Cogen Europe - European 
Association for the 
Promotion of co-generation 
Co- (often, gas) 
generators & industrial 
users interested in their 
own generation needs, 
and equipment 
producers.  Reflects 
some recent 
technological 
innovations whereby 
heat and power can be 
produced 
simultaneously. 
Established 1993.   
Pro liberalisation, and, consistent 
with its members business interests, 
promotes energy efficiency 
measures through co-generation 
with environmental NGOs such as 
WWF.       
ECC industry member. 
   
FORATOM (European 
Atomic Forum) 
Nuclear industry 
association.  France and 
Belgium are most reliant 
on nuclear electricity 
generation, with 75% 
and 58% of electricity 
respectively in these 
countries generated by 
nuclear capacities 
(Matthes and Timpe, 
2000). 
State ownership meant never in 
forefront of political activity at any 
stage, though some large members 
pro and increasingly active since 
Directive. 
   
IFIEC (International 
Federation of Industrial 
Energy Consumers)  - 
IFIEC Europe 
Association of 
Associations. IFIEC 
Europe has 13 
federations representing 
75-80% of industrial 
energy consumption in 
Europe - steel & alloys, 
chemicals, non-ferrous 
metals, cement, pulp & 
paper, food & 
packaging, automobile 
etc.   
IFIEC originally contained diverse 
views on liberalisation (French 
members esp. satisfied with 
electricity prices), though has 
generally managed a supportive 
line.   Rated by a number of players 
as central to the liberalisation debate 
and for the Commission in building 
a consensus.   
 
Noted for delivering well thought of 
responses to Commission 
consultation papers – which have 
stretched its limited resources.   
Seeking separation of 
responsibilities in supply chain 
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(IFIEC-Europe, 2000). ECC 
consumer section member . 
   
ENERG8   Formed 1992, partly in 
response to Commission 
prompting, though also 
in response to the 
difficulties of broad 
sector associations in 
reaching common 
positions.  Large scale 
user firms – Bayer, 
BASF, ICI, Dow 
Europe, Thyssen, 
Pilkington, DSM*, 
Akzo Nobel, Mercedes 
Benz, Ford (associate 
member)*, Enron*, 
KNP, BT*.  Involves 
CEOs. 
 
* - not founding 
member 
Pro, some impact on original 
liberalisation debate leading to 
Directive, and on positions of 
Associations representing these 
members, e.g. CEFIC, UNICE 
(though see CEFIC below). 
Worked closely with ‘Northern’ 
group inside EURELECTRIC. 
Inactive as a collective entity now, 
partly as a response to its growth in 
diversity, though original members 
individually remain active.  
 
   
CEFIC (European 
Chemicals Industry 
Federation), 
CEMBUREAU (European 
Cement Association), 
UNICE (Union of 
Industrial and Employers’ 
Confederations of Europe), 
UEAPME (European 
Association of Craft, Small 
and Medium Sized 
Enterprises), EUROFER 
(European Confederation 
of Iron and Steel 
Industries) 
Traditional EU sector or 
cross-industry 
associations 
Members of consumer section of 
ECC. UNICE had no difficulty in 
being pro liberalisation prior to 
1996 Directive as public sector 
utilities were not in its membership 
constituency.   CEFIC became 
responsive over time to member 
demands (e.g. ENERG8 dual 
members) for liberalisation as 
consumers, with some reports of 
early collective action difficulties in 
member agreement. 
 
   
EUROPIA (European 
Petroleum Industry 
Association) 
EU downstream 
petroleum sector 
association 
Member of industry section of ECC.  
Not historically active or significant 
in liberalisation debate - no public 
positions. 
   
ERT – European Round 
Table of Industrialists 
By invite only, Chief 
Executive Officers 
(CEO) of Europe’s 
largest companies; 
fluctuating over time 
around 45 members, 
more of an ‘agenda 
setting’ think tank than 
an operational lobby 
Active c. 1991-3 in supporting the 
case for liberalisation as part of 
wider agenda for competitiveness of 
European industry. 
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organisation.  
   
EETC – European Energy 
and Telecom Consulting, 
and its conference format 
EEMF – European Energy 
Millennium Forum 
Consultant led forum 
group of producers 
formed December 1998.  
Brussels based, now 
operated from offices of 
public affairs 
consultancy Edelman. 
Pro, though not involved in detail of 
debate.   
   
UCTE, formerly UCPTE 
- Union for the Co-
ordination of the 
Production and 
Transmission of Electricity 
Grid operators formed 
1951, then concerned 
with non competitive 
cross border continental 
distribution, focusing 
post liberalisation on 
switching and metering 
issues of exchange. 
Originally opposed to liberalisation 
and then aligned with ‘reluctants’ 
group position. Not a significant 
player in political debate on 
liberalisation. 
 ECC industry member. 
   
ETSO – European 
Association of 
Transmission System 
Operators 
Formed 1999 as a result 
of the liberalisation 
directive requirement 
for the independence of 
transmission system 
operators.  Network grid 
company users, whose 
formation encouraged 
by Commission.  Aimed 
at solving problems such 
as congestion 
management, 
bottlenecks, transit 
costing of transmission - 
i.e. the technical 
requirements of single 
market creation.   
Post liberalisation organisation 
which, whilst technical in nature 
focusing on the regulatory issues of 
implementation of the internal 
energy market, is company driven. 
   
CIGRE  - International 
Conference on Electrical 
Cabling 
Cables specialist 
technical organisation, 
with European and non 
European members.   
Not significant in liberalisation 
   
CIRED – International 
Conference on Electricity 
Distribution 
Formed 1971 for 
information exchange 
between parties active in 
electrical distribution, 
from utilities, low 
volume transmitters, to 
electrical engineers – 
knowledge, technical 
information, etc.  
Not significant in liberalisation 
   
EUROGAS (European 
Union of the Natural Gas 
Gas generators. Possible 
future merger with 
Broadly pro, though not central in 
electricity liberalisation - mainly 
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Industry) EURELECTIC into 
mega energy wide trade 
association.  Already 
some overlapping 
membership, though 
competitive interests 
with electricity restrict 
extent.   
focused on gas liberalisation, with 
significant member reservations on 
upstream gas liberalisation.   
ECC industry member. 
   
EWEA - European Wind 
Energy Association. 
Formed 1982, focused 
on wind renewables.   
Not central in liberalisation. 
   
GEODE - European Group 
of Enterprises and 
Organisations of Energy 
Distribution 
Barcelona based.  
Independent municipal 
distributors, e.g. 
Grenoble.  Company 
based.   
 
Very pro, differences in view as to 
how central a role they have played  
- well connected with regulators.  
ECC industry member. 
   
Brussels Energy Round 
Table 
 
Commissioner van 
Miert creation – network 
industry club formed c. 
1995 to assist with 
support for the 
liberalisation agenda. 
Created to boost support for 
liberalisation. 
   
CEEP - European Centre 
of Enterprises with Public 
Participation and of 
Enterprises of General 
Economic Interest 
Public Sector Employers 
- though also active on 
wider public sector 
issues.   
Originally anti liberalisation with 
employment related concerns.  An 
avenue for concerns of the 
‘reluctants’ group.  Member, 
consumer section of Energy 
Consultative Committee 
   
EPSU - European 
Federation of Public 
Service Unions; EMCEF - 
European Mine, Chemical 
and Energy Workers’ 
Federation; ETUC – 
European Trade Union 
Confederation 
EU level Trade Unions 
most affected by 
liberalisation 
Anti liberalisation, based on 
concerns about job & membership 
losses.  ESPU organised ‘European 
Action Day’ in May 1999 and a 
large  protest demonstration (20,000 
energy workers claimed) in Berlin, 
and issued joint statement of 
opposition to liberalisation with 
CEDEC.  Literature reflects that 
concerns to mitigate job losses have 
not been taken into account by any 
measures in EU legislation, despite 
Commission statement to European 
Parliament in 1996 for specific 
measures (EPSU, 1999).  EMCEF, 
EPSU and EURELECTRIC have 
recently (7 November 2000) 
concluded a joint declaration on the 
social implications of the Internal 
Electricity Market as part of their 
broader social dialogue, 
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emphasising consultation, re-
training and structural employment 
adjustment, information 
dissemination (EPSU, 2000).  
Recent activities of Trade Unions 
have been based upon achieving 
such initiatives, and gaining 
consultative status in regulatory 
activities.  EPSU, EMCEF and 
ETUC are all represented on the 
Energy Consultative Committee.   
 
 
 
2. Firms very Active at the EU level in Electricity Liberalisation 
 
Electricité de France  
(F) 
 
active in Brussels c. 1989.  Most reluctant party throughout, 
though some claims that there are more liberal pockets within EdF 
than the present public position of the French govt.  See also 
‘Reluctants/EURELECTRIC’ above.   
Electrabel (B)  Always Brussels based.  Reluctants group, recently more detached.   
RWE (D) active in Brussels c. 1989.  Initially reluctant, later pro. 
Preussen Elektra (D) active in Brussels c. 1989.  Initially reluctant, later pro. 
Bayernwerke (D) active in Brussels c. 1989.  Initially reluctant, later pro. 
National Power (UK) active in Brussels c. 1989.   Pro from start. 
PowerGen (UK) active in Brussels c. 1989.   Pro from start. 
SydKraft (S) active in Brussels c. 1989.   Pro from start. 
Vattenfall (S) active in Brussels c. 1989.   Pro from start. 
Endessa (E) Recently (c. 1998) active in Brussels.  Pro. 
Redelectrica (E) Recently (c. 1998) active in Brussels.  Pro. 
Enron (US) Electricity trader.  Active in Brussels during liberalisation.  Pro, 
frustrated with progress of TPA, pursuing published price tariffs 
agenda. 
Enel (I) Recently (c. 1998) active in Brussels; positions not always 
historically clear 
SEP (common Dutch 
generators organisation) 
/TenneT (NL - joint 
grid ownership by state 
& largest producers)  
Active in Brussels 
 
 
 
3. National Business Interest Associations Historically very Active at the EU level in 
Electricity Liberalisation 
 
Association of Electricity Producers – UK 
 
Founded 1997, yet to spread out beyond UK.  
Pro liberalisation, includes gas generators. 
Electricity Association – UK Brussels based since c. 1993 
VDEW – Germany Brussels based. 
EnergieNed – NL Brussels based. 
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4. Public Interest Groups 
 
Consumer Organisations BEUC (Bureau Européen des Unions de 
Consommateurs), COFACE (Confederation of Family 
Organisations in the EC), EUROCOOP, IEIC (Institut 
Européen Interégional de la Consommateur) were 
supportive of liberalisation, though to differing 
degrees.  Some had concerns about the pedestrian 
speed at which price reductions were likely to come to 
domestic consumers, and about public service 
obligations (safety; quality; universality) in the early 
stages of debate prior to the 1996 Directive (BEUC, 
op.cit).  Not all consumer organisations were active 
campaigners and none were central, though BEUC, 
COFACE, and EUROCOOP are members of the 
consumer section of the Energy Consultative 
Committee. 
Environmental Non Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) 
Four of the environmental  ‘G8’1 EU public interest 
environmental organisations have been active on EU 
Electricity Liberalisation. Climate Network Europe 
(CNE; lead organisation); WorldWide Fund for 
Nature (WWF); Greenpeace; and Friends of the Earth 
(FoE), have issued joint statements on the subject.  
Whilst recognising at an early stage in the (pre 1996) 
process the opportunities which liberalisation might 
bring for environmental improvement (such as the 
development of natural gas combined heat and power 
stations rather than fossil fuels or nuclear, an outcome 
of liberalisation in the UK), these organisations have 
pressed the case with the Commission for specific 
actions.  Whilst environmental considerations are not 
expected by play a significant role in the Acceleration 
Directive draft2, many have found outlets in other 
policy initiatives, such as the May 2000 Directive on 
Renewables, transparency pricing, carbon tax, and 
emission trading.   Some alliances with industry have 
emerged, eg joint statements from WWF with 
COGEN Europe (Matthes and Timpe, 2000; WWF & 
GOCGEN Europe, 2000). Some Greenpeace 
personnel are well linked with the Commission as 
former employees.    
 CNE is represented on the Energy Consultative 
Committee.    
Others Never a central campaign issue for the European 
Citizens’ Action Service (ECAS) or other NGOs. 
 
 
                                                          
1 A network comprising European Environmental Bureau (EEB); World Wide Fund for Nature 
(WWF); Transport & Environment (T&E); Birdlife International; Greenpeace; Friends of the Earth; 
Climate Network Europe; World Conservation Union (IUCN) 
2 Whilst it is not possible to know whether issues have been incorporated until a draft appears, 
representations have been made by environmental NGOs on measures to address state aid and 
subsidies; provision of information on source of provision; sources of funding for connection charges 
for renewable energy sources; and targets for co-generation supply. 
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5. Other EU formally constituted (non industry) organisations  
 
ECC – Electricity Consultative Cttee Formed 1998 post liberalisation, with 
sections for representation of producer 
(industry, trade union) and consumer 
(industry, household consumers).   Has not 
been significant in liberalisation debate. 
  
Council of European Energy Regulators No EU regulator or uniform national model 
of regulation, hence a forum for regulators 
from national environments; ‘acceleration 
directive’ places pressures for harmonisation 
of national systems of regulation, so likely to 
expand scope – though a ‘European 
Regulator’ not formally part of the agenda, 
most countries have positions on the concept.  
Florence Regulatory Forum Council of Regulators, plus other central 
players in regulatory discussion & 
information exchange forum.  Established in 
1998, two meetings per year, focused on the 
problems of cross border trade, such as 
tariffs, and congestion management. 
 
 
 
Conclusion: What does Electricity Liberalisation Tell Us About EU Interest 
Representation? 
 
Interest intermediation is not in the forefront of the story of EU electricity liberalisation.  
EU level interest representation played nothing more than a supporting role for events that 
would have happened anyway, and do not appear to have influenced the main character of 
legislation that emerged.  Only certain, largely non central, details have been influenced by 
public and private interest actors.  The key factors which explain the outcomes of electricity 
liberalisation concern: 
 
• the role of the Commission in driving the single market agenda forward;  
• the presence of a recent workable model in the UK;  
• the Commission’s skilful use of competition policy powers to bring France/EdF to work 
within the scope of a Directive which interests in that country might otherwise not want;  
• the Commission’s fleetness of foot in turning the ‘single buyer’ model to its advantage, 
and willingness to compromise with a ‘menu of choice’ Directive, and to accommodate a 
variety of outside inputs, so as to achieve a foot in the door, which other forces would 
later throw open;  
• the march of the liberalisation tide, and the accession of ‘pro’ countries;  
• the impact of German domestic interests, in seeking cheaper electricity prices in the most 
expensive European market, in changing the position of the German government to pro 
liberalisation. 
 
Interest intermediation therefore played a role mainly at the domestic level, and through 
France’s position as owner-shareholder of EdF, in shaping the character of the first Directive.  
The interesting task is to try to identify the conditions under which interest intermediation is 
likely to take a back seat in European integration.  Grande (1996) rightly draws attention to 
the ways in which the multi-level architecture of the EU limits the role of outside interests in 
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the EU political systems, generating pressures for pluralistic outcomes because of the ways in 
which multiple entry points creates a ‘lobbying free for all’.  Political systems can help 
insulate themselves from outside interest pressures through this multiple architecture, 
knowing that bargains struck in one setting cannot be made for other arenas, and by playing 
‘two level games’.   Tendencies over time to disperse power between and within political 
institutions, through procedures such as QMV and co-decision, provide for greater levels of 
insulation through complexity.  Yet these are largely factors that do not vary across single 
market policy arenas.  Integration in some sectors has been driven by outside interests, 
whereas in others such interests have taken a back seat.  What features about the electricity 
sector, which may well be present in other sectors, predict the latter outcome? 
 
The first contributory factor concerns the nature of the debate under question.  The issue 
of electricity liberalisation was high politics, because it involved the delivering of an essential 
commodity to every enterprise and household in Europe, national systems of essential 
commodity delivery, and challenges to national champions.  It also involved challenging 
national principles, such as the French tradition of public service, through the alternative 
system of liberalisation.  This is quite different from technical issues of widget harmonisation 
which might safely be left to trade associations to undertake.  No matter how fuzzy the 
formulation appears in concept, the original distinction of Hoffman between ‘High’ and 
‘Low’ politics retains considerable utility of a rough and ready character in practice 
(Hoffman, 1966).  High politics are dominated by member states and political institutions, 
whereas low politics are dominated by largely private interests and their representative 
organisations, in conjunction with political institutions.   
 
The second contributory set of factors concerns the nature of the product and the 
characteristics of the industry sector. Where the interest concerned is already involved in 
substantial trading on a transnational basis, colonised by firms used to operating in different 
national environments, so there is likely to be a prior history of transnational organisation.  
Unlike telecommunications, electricity has yet to become a global market because of the 
difficulties involved in transporting, trading and exchanging electricity on a global basis.  At 
best, it can only be a product exchanged within a regional basis in the globe (e.g. Europe), 
because it is limited by the distance it is possible to construct physical infrastructure for 
transporting electricity across high voltage wires.  Telecommunications, on the other hand, 
can become a global industry because of satellite technology.  These realities, together with 
the absence of liberalisation and the presence of regional and national monopoly suppliers, 
meant that transnational organisation has historically been weak, and, where it has existed, 
tends to have been focused on technical issues of exchanges rather than political 
representation (Bartle, 1999).  Interest organisation within the industry varied across 
European in national settings, because of differences in the way the industry was constructed, 
making transnational interest organisation difficult.  In France, for instance, the presence of 
monopoly suppliers owned by the state meant that there was no need for significant political 
organisation.  In Germany, on the other hand, the industry has historically been populated by 
a large number of distributors, including a number of dominant regional monopoly utilities, 
which has meant that there has been an interest organisation (VDEW) of long standing for the 
industry.  Such a mixed ownership pattern across Europe, ranging from large monopolies to 
small municipal suppliers, is not conducive to transnational interest organisation.  Indeed 
today, at the European level the electricity supply industry includes separate associations for 
large utilities (EURELECTRIC), and smaller municipal suppliers who are themselves 
differentiated in interest organisation (CEDEC, GEODE). 
 
A third set of explanations for the lack of interest dynamics concern the lack of 
regulation, the absence of a ‘common enemy’, and the ways in which differences in interests 
to regulation condition associational capacities.  Where there is a history of regulatory 
competencies invested in transnational authorities, so the industry is likely to have some 
degree of transnational organisation.  None of these factors were present in the electricity 
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sector prior to the 1988 Green Paper.  Until the Commission proposed liberalisation, interest 
organisation of the business sector at the European level was either non-existent, or at the 
margins and focused on technical exchanges of electricity and know-how. The Commission 
Green Paper changed these dynamics, and prompted the electricity supply industry to create a 
European level organisation to oppose the proposals (EURELECTRIC).  Yet once 
organisations that were favourable to liberalisation participated, so the capacity of the 
industry to deliver common positions was completely undermined.   There was no ‘common 
enemy’ in regulation, nor in the position of industry consumers whose organisation required 
the assistance of Commission stimulation and which lacked substance where electricity prices 
could be kept low.  These are not favourable conditions for trade associations to operate in.  
For trade associations to be effective, they need as a basis to exist in a climate of trust 
between members, which enables a high degree of autonomy to be provided to the association 
secretariat to engage with political institutions.  Without these factors, and in the 
circumstances of fundamentally opposed member interests, interest representation is likely to 
be channelled through national routes.  
 
A final factor that took the arena beyond private interest politics at the EU level was the 
strong position of the Commission from which to take liberalisation forward.  They did so as 
part of the wider drive to complete the single market, which in the wake of the passage of the 
Single European Act and ‘project 1992’ had unstoppable momentum, and widespread support 
among big business interests as whole.  Historically, the Commission of the late 1980s was a 
confident one on the march, led by a visionary.    Even when the Commission ran into the 
turbulence of the early 1990s, it could still rely upon a choice of regulatory instruments, 
including the opportunity to apply pressure through the European Court of Justice.  The 
competent units within DG XVII/DG TREN were of sufficient size, while the issues were 
large enough to attract patronage within the Commission at the highest level throughout.  
From 1989, a working model for the scheme was provided by the UK, regulatory and 
scientific expertise was always available, while the prospect of Nordic accession always 
promised to enlarge the constituency of support.  Large firms could be mobilised and 
stimulated to collective action in support by the prospect of cheaper electricity (EFET, 
ENERG8), and the utilities themselves were divided.  Amongst non-business interests, only 
trade unions, hardly equipped to stop the process at the European level, expressed outright 
opposition to the proposals, whilst consumer and environmental organisations were broadly 
supportive on the thrust, if not always the detail.  In these circumstances, it seems, the 
Commission had little to fear from taking the agenda forward, and adapting to accommodate 
the diversions it met en route.    
 
Taken together, a combination of circumstances made the issue unlikely to be one in 
which private and public interests were able to take a front seat.  These were: a ‘high politics’ 
issue and the intergovernmental nature of the politics which underlay these; a climate driven 
by ideas; the unfavourable circumstances for transnational collective action provided by the 
characteristics of the industry, the structure of private business producer interests, and the 
nature of regulation; the factors disabling concerted industrial consumer pressures; the 
plurality of interests within private, and among private and public interests; and the 
favourable circumstances for the Commission to drive the issue forward independently.  
Ideas, and institutions, it seems, triumph over private interest intermediation as explanations 
for EU electricity liberalisation. 
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